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Humphries v. Ozmint
No. 03-14, 2005 WL 267962, at *1
(4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005)

I. Facts
On December 31, 1993, Shawn Paul Humphries and Eddie Blackwell stole
a gun and spent the night driving around and drinking. Early the next morning,
the two young men entered the South Carolina convenience store in which
Donna Brashier and Dickie Smith were working. Humphries revealed the stolen
gun and demanded money from Smith, the owner, who was working behind the
store's counter. Smith reached for a weapon under the counter, and Humphries
reacted by firing a single shot that struck Smith in the head and killed him.
Leaving Blackwell behind, Humphries immediately fled the scene. Blackwell
remained in the store, where the police arrested him, and Humphries was apprehended later that day.
A South Carolina jury convicted Humphries of murder, attempted robbery,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, and criminal
conspiracy. During the sentencing phase, the State offered the evidence from
the guilt phase, additional testimony describing Smith's positive characteristics
and community contributions, crime scene photographs, and Humphries's
criminal record.3 The defense sought to establish various mitigating factors,
including Humphries's lack of a significant history of violent crime, the abuse
the defendant endured throughout his childhood, and his positive personal
attributes.4
During closing argument, the prosecutor listed four elements for the jury
to consider in determining the appropriate punishment: the aggravating evidence, the character of the defendant, mitigating evidence, and the uniqueness
of the victim.5 After discussing the evidence to prove aggravation, the prosecutor related in detail Humphries's troubled past, beginning with his first criminal
offense at age thirteen.6 He further argued that the defense was unable to
produce any mitigating evidence and then subsequently turned his attention to
Humphries v. Ozmint, No. 03-14, 2005 WL 267962, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005)
1.
(citing State v. Humphries, 479 S.E.2d 52, 53 (S.C. 1996)).
2.
Id. at *2.

3.
4.

Id.
Id.

5.

Id. at *4.

6.

Id.
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the character of the victim.7 In recounting Smith's uniqueness, the prosecutor
provided a biographical chronology in which he compared the lives of the victim
and defendant in 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1992.8 Specifically, the prosecutor stated:
[I]n 1984 [Smith] met Pat, and they fell in love, and theygot married.
That's the same year Shawn Paul Humphries committed two house
break-ins at age 13. In 1986 Dickie maes a pretty drastic move. He
decides he's going to quit Kemet and go build houses full-time, and he
goes out, and he starts building homes in the community he had
grown up in. That's the same year Shawn Paul Humphries is up for his
second probation violation and sent down to Columbia. Then in
1988, July the 4th, they have a little baby girl named Ashley. ... In
1988 Ashley is bom. That's the same year Shawn Paul Humphries
went to jail for two years. And in the spring of 1992, 1 believe, Dickie
Smith opens the doors to the MaxSaver, building a business down in
that community.9
The prosecutor concluded by stating that while the defendant was asking the jury
for life, "he gave death.""
In response, defense counsel reiterated its case for leniency by summarizing
the mitigating factors presented during the penalty hearing." The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court sentenced Humphries to death. 2
The trial court also overruled the defense's post-trial motion for a new trial, a
motion in which Humphries belatedly objected to the State's comparison of
Smith and Humphries during closing argument. 3
On direct appeal, the state supreme court affirmed the convictions and
death sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 4 Thereafter, Humphries applied for postconviction relief, contending, inter alia, that the
State violated Paynev. Tennessee5 by comparing the defendant to the victim during
its closing argument and that defense counsel's failure to object to this comparison amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. 6 The state habeas
court, however, rejected the Humphries's application for postconviction relief,
7.

Humpbries, 2005 WL 267962, at *4-*5.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at *7.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at *6.
13.
Humphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *7.
14.
Id.; see Humphries v. South Carolina, 520 U.S. 1268, 1268 (1997) (denying certiorari).
15.
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
16.
Humpbries,2005 WL 267962, at *7-*8; see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)
(cautioning that "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides a mechanism for relief').
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and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. 7 Humphries then sought
federal habeas corpus relief.' The United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina dismissed the petition by granting the State's motion for
summary judgment but granted Humphries a certificate of appealability. 9 A
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
vacated the death sentence and remanded the case with instructions to issue the
writ solely for the purpose of resentencing 0 The State, however, petitioned for
rehearing, and the Fourth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. 2'
II. Holding
Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit rejected the panel's earlier decision to
reverse Humphries's death sentence and, instead, affirmed the district court's
judgment. 22 Reviewing the state court's decision under the standard set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Fourth Circuit held that the state court was correct in
finding that the prosecution did not violate Payne by comparing the victim to the
defendant to support its case for the death penalty.23 Therefore, defense counsel
24
were not ineffective for failing to object to the State's closing argument.
Furthermore, the court rejected Humphries's claim that the State's failure to
notify the defense of its intention to use victim-impact evidence at 2sentencing
5
violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. Anaysis
A. Standardof Review
Because the South Carolina courts adjudicated Humphries's claim on the
merits and Humphries exhausted his state court remedies, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the state court's decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 6 Under §
2254(d)(1), federal courts may only grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state
17. Iumphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *7.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000) (outlining the procedure for issuing a certificate of
appealability; part of AEDPA).
20. Humphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *7.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *20.
23. Id. at *16; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (discussing the standard of review for federal
courts reviewing a habeas corpus petition on issues of law and also factual issues that the state
courts adjudicated on the merits; part of AEDPA).
24. Humphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *16.
25. Id. at *19.
26. Id. at *8; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (discussing the standard of review for federal courts
reviewing a petition for habeas corpus on issues of law that the state courts adjudicated on the
merits; part of AEDPA).
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court's adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 27 In Williams v. Taylor,8
the Supreme Court held that
[A] state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court. . . "(1) if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme
Court] cases," or (2) "if the state court con fronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court
arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court]
and nevertheless
'29
precedent.
Moreover, in distinguishing an unreasonable application of law from an incorrect
one, Williams held that a state court decision is unreasonable " 'if the state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's
case.' ,"30
B. Payne Analysis
Humphries argued that the prosecutor's closing argument offended the
Supreme Court's ruling in Payne and that, consequently, defense counsel's failure
to object timely to the violation and the resulting prejudice to Humphries
amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.3' In analyzing
Humphries's claim, the Fourth Circuit first examined United States Supreme
Court precedent regarding victim impact evidence. 32 Contrary to the previous
rulings in Booth v. Mayland 3 and South Carolinav. Gathers,34 the Supreme Court in
Payne determined that victim-impact evidence was relevant to the imposition of
a death sentence.35 In overruling its recent precedent, the Supreme Court plainly
27.
28.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
529 U.S. 362 (2000).

29.

Humpbries, 2005 WL 267962, at *8 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000)).
30.

Id. (quoting Wiliams, 529 U.S. at 413).

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.
34.
35.

482 U.S. 496 (1987).
490 U.S. 805 (1989).
Humphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *9-*10; see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03

(1987) (holding that victim-impact evidence is irrelevant to a determination of whether to impose
a death sentence and that its admission risks arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-812 (1989) (concluding that both the
prosecutor's reading of a religious tract carried by the victim and the prosecutor's description of the
victim violated Booth).
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stated that "if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim-impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects
'
However, the Fourth Circuit noted that "Payne only allows
no per se bar."36
evidence of the victim's personal characteristics and the harm inflicted upon the
victim's family and community., 37 Therefore, the Supreme Court did not disturb
its precedent forbidding the admission of victim opinion regarding the crime and
appropriate sentence.3" Lastly, the Supreme Court "cautioned that, '[i]n the event
that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides a mechanism for relief.'
Because the Supreme Court gave no specific guidelines for the type of
victim-impact evidence that would violate a defendant's due process rights, the
Fourth Circuit looked to Payne's citation to Darden v. Wlainnright. ° In determining
whether a prosecutor's improper comments rendered the subsequent conviction
a denial of due process, Dardenapplied the due process standard used in Donnely
v. DeChristoforo,4" in which the Court examined an alleged due process violation
by considering the challenged conduct in relation to the proceeding as a whole.4"
Applying both Darden and DeChristoforo, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
analysis of Humphries's due process claim, which was premised on unfair
prosecutorial conduct, required the examination of several factors.43
Explaining its conclusion that the Supreme Court of South Carolina
reasonably applied Payne in ruling that the prosecutor's closing argument did not
render the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair, the Fourth Circuit first
noted that the prosecutor's comments did not center on the alleged comparison
between the lives of the victim and defendant."
Instead, the victim36.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
37.
Humpbries, 2005 WL 267962, at *10.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825).
40.
Id.; see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (stating that a prosecutor's
argument is improper if the comments are so unfair as to make the conviction a denial of due
process).
41.
416 U.S. 637 (1974).
42.
Hupbries,2005 WL 267962, at *11; see Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 639
(1974) (considering the due process implications of inappropriate prosecutorial remarks in the
context of the entire trial).
43.
Humphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *11. The Fourth Circuit listed such factors as "the nature
of the prosecutorial misconduct, the extent of the improper conduct, the issuance of curative
instructions from the court, any defense conduct inviting the improper prosecutorial response, and
the weight of the evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
44.
Id. at * 13. Because the Supreme Court of South Carolina on state habeas determined that
Payne proscribed victim-to-victim comparisons that were not present in Humphries, the court
determined whether the solicitor's closing argument rendered the penalty phase of the capital trial
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impact evidence played only a supporting role to the prosecution's argument that
the defendant deserved death based on the aggravating evidence, the defendant's
character, and the lack of mitigating evidence.4" Furthermore, rather than
compare the worth of the lives of the victim and defendant as Payne prohibits,
the victim-impact evidence presented by the solicitor invited a comparison of the
life histories of the two men.6
Much like the South Carolina court, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
prosecution based its closing argument on facts already established throughout
the course of the trial."7 During the sentencing proceeding, both the prosecution
and defense presented, without objection, testimony regarding the lives of the
victim and defendant."8 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the state
court did not unreasonably apply Payne."9 Regarding the third and fourth reasons
for upholding the state court decision, the Fourth Circuit noted that the prosecutor, earlier in the closing argument, had described in great detail the facts of
Humphries's life and also that the statements to which Humphries objected only
focused the jury's attention on the victim's uniqueness.5'
As a fifth reason to support its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit posited a
harmless error argument.5 ' The court emphasized that neither the facts of the
case nor the aggravating factor of committing the murder during the commission
of an armed robbery were in question. 2 Furthermore, the prosecution countered
the mitigating evidence offered by the defendant, and the defense did not contest
the victim's uniqueness.5 3 Consequently, the court determined that "notwith[found] so objectionable, a
standing the solicitor's comparison that Humphries
54
sentence of death would have resulted.

fundamentally unfair. Id.at *12. The state court concluded that the government's closing argument
was based on evidence previously introduced at trial, and therefore, the solicitor's comments were
not so unduly prejudicial as to violate the petitioner's due process rights. Id. Consequendy,
Humphries could establish neither that defense counsel was ineffective nor that the alleged
ineffectiveness prejudiced the sentencing outcome. Id.
Id. at *13.
45.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at *14.
48.
Id.
Humpbries, 2005 WL 267962, at *13-*14.
49.
50.
Id.

51.

Id. at *15.

52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Next, the Fourth Circuit highlighted the Supreme Court of South Carolina's
decision in Hall v. Catoe,55 another recent state case involving a Payne claim. 6
Unlike the facts in Humpbies,the solicitor in Hallspecifically compared the worth
of the lives of the victim and defendant when asking for the imposition of the
death penalty.57 In distinguishing the two cases, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina "reasonably concluded one [of the closing arguments made by the
solicitors] was constitutionally proper and the other was not.""
59
Finally, the Fourth Circuit examined the Court's language in Payne. Payne
permits the prosecution to "counteract" a defendant's mitigating evidence by
introducing victim-impact evidence regarding the victim's uniqueness and harm
to the victim's family and community.6" Viewed in this light, victim-impact
evidence itself invites "a comparison between the victim-impact evidence and the
defendant's mitigating evidence."'" The Fourth Circuit concluded that the state
court reasonably determined that the prosecutor's life-history comparison and
the description of the victim's unique character were within the boundaries of
62
Payne.
C Petitioner's Cim ofLack of Notice
Humphries further argued that the State's failure to notify him of its intent
to use victim-impact evidence during the penalty phase violated his constitutional
right to a fair trial. 63 Specifically, Humphries contended that South Carolina
Code § 16-3-20(B) required the prosecution to notify the defense of the evidence
that the Government intended to use at the sentencing proceeding and that the
Government's failure to comply with the statute violated his federal constitutional right to due process.' 4 In response, the Fourth Circuit proffered multiple

55.
601 S.E.2d 335 (S.C. 2004).
56.
Humpbries, 2005 WL 267962, at *15; see Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004)
(distinguishing Humpbriesbecause the solicitor in the instant case explicitly compared the worth of
the victim and defendant's lives, rather than comparing life histories of the two).
57.
Hall, 601 S.E.2d at 341.
58.
Humpbies, 2005 WL 267962, at *16.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. The Supreme Court noted that" 'the State has a legitimate interest in counteracting
the mitigating evidence ... by reminding the sentencer that.., the victim is an individual whose
death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.' " Payne, 501 U.S. at 825
(quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 517).
61.
Humpnbies, 2005 WL 267962, at *16.
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at *19.
64.
Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 2003) (describing the procedures and
notification requirements for the sentencing phase of a capital trial).
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reasons for rejecting the defendant's contention.6 5 Citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 66 the
court first noted that issues of state law are "not cognizable on federal habeas
review., 67 In the alternative, the court adopted the state court's reasoning that
because victim-impact evidence is not among the aggravating factors listed in the
statute, no notice was required. 6' Finally, even if the statute required the Government to notify the defense of its intent to use the victim-impact evidence, the
State satisfied the pretrial obligation.69 The prosecution informed Humphries of
its intent to use the facts of the crime, named the eventual victim-impact witnesses in its witness lists, and notified the defense that it would present victimimpact evidence during the penalty phase. 7' Although conceding that the prosecution could have been more precise,71the court determined that section 16-320(B) did not require such specificity.
Humphries also contended that the lack of sufficient notice of the victimimpact evidence that the prosecution introduced at the sentencing proceeding
denied the petitioner the opportunity to adequately prepare a defense. 2 The
Fourth Circuit, however, rejected this claim "for the simple reason that Humphries knew or reasonably should have known that victim-impact evidence would
be used by the State during the sentencing phase of the trial."73 Without statutory support or precedent that explicitly required timely and express notice of an
intent to use victim-impact evidence, Humphries possessed "no relevant federal
authority to substantiate his claim.", 74 Therefore, the state court reasonably
interpreted federal law when it concluded that the admission of the victim-impact
evidence did not violate Humphries's Fourteenth Amendment rights.7"

IV. Application in Vi'ginia
A. Victim-Impact Etidence in Viginia
Virginia statutorily permits the introduction of victim-impact evidence in
capital trials.76 Upon motion by the Commonwealth, a victim may "testify in the
Humphries, 2005 WL 267962, at *19.
65.
66.
497 U.S. 764 (1990).
67.
Humphnes, 2005 WL 267962, at *19; see Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,780 (1990) (stating
that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law").
Humphfies, 2005 WL 267962, at *19 (citing Humphries, 479 S.E.2d at 55).
68.
69.
Id.
Id.
70.
71.
Id.
Id.
72.
73.
Id.
Humphies, 2005 WL 267962, at *19.
74.
75.
Id.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(AI) (Michie 2004) (allowing the prosecution in capital
76.
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presence of the accused regarding the impact of the offense upon the victim,"
but the victim-impact evidence is limited to the six factors found in Virginia
Code section 19.2-299.1." 7 Although these limitations seemingly curtail the
breadth of the evidence to which a victim may testify, the final factor permits the
introduction of "such other information as the court may require related to the
impact of the offense upon the victim."78 This last provision effectively removes
the teeth from the statutory limitation and entrusts the entire matter to the
court's discretion.79
In Weeks v. Commonwealtb,s the Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted Pyne
to find that victim-impact evidence is relevant during the sentencing phase of a
Virginia capital trial."' The court concluded that such testimony was "probative
...of the depravity of mind component of the vileness predicate," which serves
as one of the two aggravating factors upon which a jury may impose a death
sentence.82 Consequently, the combination of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4
and Weeks leaves little room for effective objection to the introduction of victimimpact evidence.83

trials to introduce victim-impact evidence subject to specific limitations); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2299.1 (Michie 2004) (limiting victim impact evidence to six factors).
77.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(Al); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1. The victim may:
(i) identify the victim, (ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result
of the offense, (iii) identify the nature and extent of any physical or psychological injury
suffered by the victim as a result of the offense, (iv) detail any change in the victim's
personal welfare, lifestyle or familial relationships as a result of the offense, (v) identify
any request for psychological or medical services initiated by the victim or the victim's
family as a result of the offense, and (vi) provide such other information as the court
may require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim.
VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-299.1. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01 (B) (Michie 2004) (defining "victim"
for purposes of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4).
78.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1.
79.
See id. (allowing a victim to "provide such other information as the court may require
related to the impact of the offense upon the victim").
80.
450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).
81.
See Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (Va. 1994) (holding that "victim
impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution in Virginia').
82.
Id. at 390; see
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (permitting the imposition of
a death sentence upon the finding of future dangerousness or that the commission of the crime was
outrageously or wantonly vile).
83.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(A1) (Michie 2004) (allowing the prosecution in capital
trials to introduce victim-impact evidence subject to specific limitations); Wleeks, 450 S.E.2d at 389
(holding that "victim impact testimony is relevant to punishment in a capital murder prosecution

in Virginia'.
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B. The Limitations of Victim-Impact Eidence UnderPayne
Although the United States Supreme Court concluded that the use of
victim-impact testimony in capital trials does not constitute a per se violation of
the Eighth Amendment, the prosecution cannot introduce evidence "that is so

unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. ' 4 The Court,
however, provided no guidance as to what evidence would constitute undue
prejudice.S As a result, the Fourth Circuit in Humphries applied the analysis of
DeChristoforoand "consider[ed] the challenged [victim-impact evidence] in relation
to the proceeding as a whole.""6
In Beck v. Commonwealth, s7 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the
admissibility of victim-impact evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding is
contingent upon its relevance.88 Relevance, however, does not guarantee admissibility. 89 Specifically, "[r]elevant evidence may be excluded only if the prejudicial
effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value." 9 Therefore, the fact that
victim-impact evidence may be relevant does not necessarily ensure its admissibility.
To weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect of victim-impact evidence, Virginia defense counsel should request in camera review of the testimony. Following the leads of Oklahoma and Tennessee, such procedures would
allow the court to control the proliferation of potentially prejudicial evidence
without contaminating the jury. 9' In the alternative, counsel should object to
Payne, 501 U.S. at 825.
84.
85.
Humpbres,2005 WL 267962, at "10.
86.
Id. at *11.
87.
484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
See Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898,904 (Va. 1997) (holding that "the admissibil88.
ity of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial is limited only
by the relevance of such evidence to show the impact of the defendant's actions").
89.
See Levine v. City of Lynchburg, 159 S.E. 95,97 (Va. 1931) (stating that "[all facts having
rational probative value are admissible unless some specific rule forbids" (citations omitted)).
90.
Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114,127 (Va. 1996); seeCoe v. Commonwealth, 340
S.E.2d 820,823 (Va. 1986) (stating that "when relevant evidence is offered which may be inflammatory and which may have a tendency to prejudice jurors against the defendant, its relevancy must
be weighed against the tendency of the offered evidence to produce passion and prejudice out of
proportion to its probative value').
91.
See Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 826-28 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (concluding that trial
courts should hold in camera hearings to determine whether the victim-impact evidence should be
excluded from capital sentencing proceedings on the ground that the probative value is substantially
State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn.
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice); see also
1998) (concluding that "[u]pon receiving notification [of the prosecution's intent to introduce victim
impact evidence], the trial court must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine
the admissibility of the evidence'). But see Welch v. State, 968 P.2d 1231, 1243 (Okla. Crim. App.
1998) (finding harmless error when the trial court failed to conduct in camera review of victimimpact evidence because defense objections at trial provided sufficient protection).
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victim-impact evidence admitted at the discretion of the court pursuant to
Virginia Code section 19.2-299.1 if it threatens a defendant's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.92 Such evidence, however, must significantly affect the
defendant's due process rights in light of the entire sentencing proceeding.9 3 A
reviewing court may consider "the nature of the prosecutorial misconduct, the
extent of the improper conduct, the issuance of curative instructions from the
court, any defense conduct inviting the improper prosecutorial response, and the
'
Therefore, attorneys should object on record to each
weight of the evidence." 94
instance of improper prosecutorial conduct and to the inadequacies of judicial
remedial measures. Although such actions may have little effect during the
sentencing hearing, the objections will preserve a record of the nature and extent
of the abuses for appeal.
C. Notice Requirements of Due Process
Although a due process claim based on the prosecution's alleged failure to
comply with state law will never be appropriate for federal habeas review, a jury
cannot base the imposition of a death sentence on information that the defense
has not had the "opportunity to deny or explain."9" In Humphries, the Fourth
Circuit noted that the defense "knew or reasonably should have known that
victim-impact evidence would be used by the State during the sentencing phase
of the trial."96 Specifically, the court found that the prosecution notified
Humphries of its intent to introduce evidence concerning the commission of the
crime, provided the defense with witness lists containing the names of the victimimpact witnesses, and informed the defendant of its intent to introduce the
victim-impact evidence during the penalty phase of the trial."7 Therefore, if the
Government fails to provide such minimal notice, Humphries suggests that a
defendant may have a legitimate due process claim.98 However, because the court
concluded that "no law... clearly requires timely, specific, and express notice of

92.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-299.1 (Michie 2004) (permitting the introduction of evidence
"as the court may require related to the impact of the offense upon the victim"); Payne, 501 U.S. at
825 (noting that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism
for relief" if the introduction of victim-impact evidence renders a capital defendant's trial fundamentally unfair).
Hmbhries, 2005 WL 267962, at *11.
93.
Id. (citations omitted).
94.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977); see Jeffers, 497 U.S. at 780 (stating that
95.
"federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law').
96.
Humpries, 2005 WL 267962, at *19.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
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victim-impact evidence," defense counsel must illustrate a substantial lack of
notice in order to succeed on federal habeas review.99

V. Conclusion
To determine the parameters of acceptable victim-impact evidence under
Payne, the Fourth Circuit applied the due process analysis of DeCbristoforoand
examined the alleged prosecutorial misconduct in relation to the entire trial.'
The court concluded that under the circumstances of Humpbries,a prosecutor's
comparison of the life histories of the victim and defendant falls within the
bounds of Payne and does not render the trial fundamentally unfair.'0 ' Furthermore, the prosecution need not provide the defense with explicit notification of
its intent to present victim-impact evidence to comply with the mandates of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Mark J. Goldsmith

99.
100.

Id.
Id. at *11.

101.
102.

Id. at *16.
Huflphris,2005 WL 267962, at *19.

